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POLICE ENCOURAGEMENT AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
BARRY

D. GREEN*

In deterring and investigating crime, local police and federal officials have numerous tools at their disposal. They can, for example,
patrol neighborhoods, obtain search warrants, use roadblocks, run
undercover operations, and employ wiretaps. Constitutional, statutory, and judicial limits exist, however, to limit the power of the police to intrude into the lives of the American people. For example,
the fourth amendment constrains the ability of the police to obtain
search warrants,' and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 establishes a statutory mechanism to review
applications for wiretaps.2 Moreover, in Sorrells v. United States,s
the Supreme Court established a subjective entrapment defense
which prevents the convictions of defendants who are "entrapped" 4
by undercover operations.6
The Supreme Court has refused, however, to hold that under* A.B., with distinction, Cornell University; J.D., Yale University; 1987-88 law
clerk for the Honorable John Walker, Jr., United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York.
The author would like to thank Professors Steven Duke and Abraham Goldstein
of Yale Law School for their thoughtful comments and assistance in completing this
article. The author is, as always, indebted to Professor Walter LaFeber of Cornell for
his guidance and encouragement.
1. The fourth amendment states that warrants must be based on probable
cause. U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment requires that police obtain a warrant to search, except under exigent circumstances. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951). These exigent circumstances include the threat of removal or destruction of
evidence or contraband, and the flight of a suspect. Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 1015 (1948).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982).
3. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
4. The Sorrells Court stated that entrapment occurs when "the defendant is a
person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged
offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials." 287 U.S. at
451. Entrapment is established by determining whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime, id., or he was an "unwary innocent." Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). The test thus depends on the subjective state of
mind of the defendant prior to commission of the crime. See United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973), Lopez v. United States. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
5. The use of the term "undercover operations" includes the use of secret
agents, electronic surveillance, informants, and agent provocateurs. Mere surveillance
of a suspect is, however, excluded.
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cover operations are subject to the dictates of the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.' A majority of the Court has consistently held that the fraudulent obtaining of statements or
consents to search does not violate the fourth amendment. While
there has been considerable academic debate concerning the choice
of a subjective rather than an objective entrapment standard,' few
have examined the continued vitality and logic of the Court's rationale that undercover operations are outside the purview of the fourth
amendment.8 Nevertheless, given the Court's flexibility in interpreting the amendment since its decisions holding that the fourth
amendment does not control undercover operations,9 a return to
those cases and a comparison with the Court's more recent holdings
are in order.
Currently, there are few constitutional limits imposed on the
police in conducting undercover operations.10 For example, the
Court has allowed undercover agents to record conversations with
their targets," to testify to private conversations which they have
overheard," and to initiate contacts with a suspect to elicit incriminating statements. 3 In addition, the police do not need any antecedent justification to conduct an undercover operation,' 4 the target
6. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). For a discussion of
these cases see infra notes 71-84 and 122-44 and accompanying text.
7. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. REV. 203
(1975); Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE
L.J. 1565 (1982); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA.
L. REV. 871 (1963); Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal
Justice Dilemma, 5 SuP. CT. REV. 111 (1981); Note, Lead Us Not Into (Unwarranted)
Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense with a ReasonableSuspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1193 (1985).
8. A few articles were written in the years immediately following the Hoffa,
Lewis, and Osborn decisions. See, e.g., Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76
YALE L.J. 994 (1967). There is a dearth of recent articles arguing that the fourth
amendment does apply to undercover activities. Indeed, one author has concluded
that "any reform in the entrapment area will have to come from Congress." Note,
supra note 7, at 1221 n.168.
9. For a discussion of the Court's flexible approach in interpreting the fourth
amendment see infra notes 95-121 and accompanying text.
10. Moreover, many academics have remarked that the subjective approach to
entrapment is almost meaningless because predisposition can be proven so easily.
Gershman, supra note 7, at 1580-85; Dix, supra note 7, at 254-58. Of course, once a
person has been indicted or charged, the police may no longer obtain statements from
an accused by using an undercover agent. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264
(1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
11. E.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
12. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
13. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
14. See, e.g., Hoffa, 385 U.S. 193 (search warrant not necessary when government agent planted in defendant's hotel to hear incriminating statements); Lewis,
385 U.S. 206 (neither search warrant nor probable cause needed when undercover
agent entered defendant's home to purchase narcotics). Neither case discussed the
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can be a person that the agent already knows,"5 and there is no apparent limit on the duration of the operation. 6 Indeed, the only
constitutional limit on undercover operations is the prohibition
7
against surreptitiously removing papers from a person's files.1
Because of the impact of these operations on personal privacy
and the Court's flexible approach to fourth amendment issues in related areas,18 some restraints need to be placed on the use of undercover activities. Specifically, a warrant requirement, based on a
showing that there is reasonable suspicion to believe that crimes are
being committed, is mandated by the fourth amendment and should
be adopted by the Court.
This paper will focus on the applicability of the fourth amendment to undercover operations. The first section will examine the
need for undercover operations as a police tool. In exploring the utility of these operations, the paper will highlight the differences between consensual and nonconsensual crimes. The paper will then
discuss the various privacy interests that are affected by undercover
operations. This section will conclude that fundamental privacy concerns are intruded upon by the use of this police mechanism. The
third section will examine the Supreme Court's approach to undercover operations and the fourth amendment in general. This tracing
of the Court's jurisprudence will highlight the need to rethink the
Court's approach to undercover operations. The paper will conclude
with a suggested Constitutional standard for undercover operations
which balances the need for such operations against the privacy interests which they affect.
I.

THE NATURE OF POLICE WORK: CONSENSUAL V. NONCONSENSUAL
CRIMES

The usual model of police work is reactive: a crime is reported
and the police investigate.'" Once the investigation has reached an
evidence supporting either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, yet the Court allowed both convictions to stand. Indeed, in Hoffa it is doubtful that the police could
have found any justification for believing that Hoffa would bribe the jury. Of course,
a juror did report to the judge that someone had attempted to bribe him, but that
occurred after the undercover agent had been asked to begin his work. 385 U.S. at
296 n.3.
15. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293.
16. Id. In Hoffa the undercover agent conducted his activities for more than

two months.
17. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
18. These areas include administrative searches, Camara v. Municipal Court of
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and stops based on reasonable suspicion, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See infra notes 95-121 and accompanying text for an analysis
of this approach.
19. This discussion is largely based on materials in Abscam Ethics: Moral Issues and Deception in Law Enforcement (G. Caplan ed. 1983) [hereinafter AnSCAM
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advanced stage, the police may apply for a search warrant. If that is
granted and the police uncover enough evidence, an arrest may follow. The police intrude on individual privacy when they search or
arrest, yet the fourth amendment limits the use of these tools by
imposing a warrant requirement.20 To deter crimes before they occur, police officers walk their beats and patrol in their cars. On the
whole, however, the system is fairly unintrusive. No significant police activity is begun until a crime has been committed and reported, and only then do the police engage in significantly intrusive
behavior.
This approach to crime is effective as long as a victim or witness
is willing to come forward or the police observe the crime taking
place. However, if a crime is planned carefully, there will be no witnesses. Indeed, most consensual crimes are planned and carried out
in private. 2 Consequently, the crime will not be reported to the police, unless one of the parties changes his mind or becomes a state
witness.
Although these consensual crimes may remain unreported and
unnoticed by the police, their seriousness should not be underestimated. Narcotics, counterfeiting, corruption, prostitution, insider
trading, and sales of stolen property have serious effects on the
United States. For example, corruption and its effect on democracy
have received significant attention in light of the corrupt behavior of
certain New York City politicians.2 2 Moreover, as this highlights,
consensual crimes frequently involve an ongoing series of illegalities,
not just one-time thefts or assaults.
The police cannot ignore these crimes. First, a reactive strategy
is biased against those who commit their crimes in public. Those
who are able to commit crimes in private, therefore, are spared the
possibility of being caught if the police rely only on a reactive strategy.2s Second, and more important, these crimes are too significant
to ignore. One has only to read the daily newspaper to understand
their magnitude.2 4 Thus, the police must employ a "proactive" strategy to combat consensual crimes, while also continuing to "react" to
ETHICS].

20. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
21. Thus, by definition, the investigation of consensual crimes involves an intrusion into privacy.
22. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1986, at BI, col. 3.
23. At least one author has concluded that such reliance will result in inequities
based on wealth. Sherman, From Whodunit to Who Does It: Fairness and Target
Selection In Deceptive Investigations, in ABSCAM ETHICS, supra note 19, at 120.
24. For example, newspapers frequently report on the drug problem and its effects on the nation. In addition, each day seems to bring new arrests for insider trading. Not surprisingly, some traders have recently been arrested for cocaine use, and
the U.S. Attorney's Office suggested that there is a link between drug use and insider
trading. New York Times, Apr. 17, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
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nonconsensual offenses.
The police can employ several strategies to investigate consensual crimes. While many are relatively unintrusive, these tend not to
be very effective. For example, the number of policemen walking
beats or patrolling can be increased in the hope of catching
criminals while committing crimes. This strategy, however, is likely
to be ineffective given the nature of consensual crimes. More frequent tax audits can also be used, but such a response may only
uncover certain types of consensual crimes. Another strategy is to
create incentives for witnesses or partners-in-crime to come forward
to the police. However, this alternative is also likely to be ineffective
since the "witness" would normally be a co-conspirator and thus unlikely to respond to this strategy. In addition, false allegations may
be generated."
Given the shortcomings of the minimally intrusive strategies
just discussed, other means are used to fight consensual crimes. The
police, aware that real witnesses cannot be convinced to report consensual crimes, adopt methods which create witnesses. Undercover
operations, by injecting the police into the illegal activity, provide
them with essential information; the police are informed of the identity of those who commit consensual crimes. Consequently, the detection problem is solved. Indeed the success of this strategy is attested to by the increasing frequency with which federal officials
engage in undercover operations. In 1977, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) received an appropriation of one million dollars
for undercover work and carried out 53 operations, but five years
later the appropriation had risen to 4.5 million dollars and the number of operations had grown to 463.2 The importance of this crimefighting technique has led one Senate Committee to conclude: "Undercover operations of the United States Department of Justice
have substantially contributed to the detection, investigation, and
prosecution of criminal activity, especially organized crime and consensual crimes such as narcotics

. . .

and political corruption ....

Some use of the undercover technique is indispensable to the
25. For a further analysis of the various strategies the police may employ to
fight consensual crimes short of deceptive techniques, see Moore, Invisible Offenses:
A Challenge to Minimally Intrusive Law Enforcement, in ABSCAM ETHICS, supra
note 19, at 31-35; Kerstetter, Undercover Investigations:An Administrative Perspective, in ABSCAM ETHICS, supra note 19, at 139-44, Sherman, supra note 23, at 120-21.
Kerstetter also discusses the advantages which undercover operations offer in fighting
invisible offenses.

26. SELECT COMM. To STUDY UNDERCOVER ACTIVITIES OF COMPONENTS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT TO THE U.S. SENATE, S. REP. No. 682, 97TH
CONG., 2D SESS. 42 (1982) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The growth of undercover operations does not appear to have slowed in recent years; in 1984, the FBI received 12
million dollars for undercover work. Note, supra note 7, at 1196 n.6.
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achievement of effective law enforcement. 27 Although the police use
many different types of undercover operations in fighting consensual
crimes, two basic strategies exist. Either the police adopt a strategy
which investigates a group of possible criminals, or they target a
particular individual who is suspected of criminal activity.28
The first category of undercover operations is not directed at
convicting any particular person; rather, these operations are aimed
at uncovering criminal activity within a targeted group.29 They effectively enable the police to patrol for and deter"0 certain crimes.
For example, in the typical sting operation, the police merely create
a "criminal organization" and wait for customers to call. As the police are deterring and patrolling for offenses, however, they are also
able to obtain evidence against those who take the bait. Indeed, the
police would probably have enough evidence to arrest the putative
criminal during or after the "controlled" offense has occurred. Thus,
the neat line observed in nonconsensual offenses between patrolling/
deterring and investigating becomes blurred when it is applied to
31
consensual crimes.
When the police engage in an undercover operation which is
targeted at a specific individual, the goal is to obtain evidence
against the person, ideally culminating in an arrest. Consequently,
this type of operation closely resembles techniques the police use to
gain information concerning a nonconsensual crime. While the police could have chosen to use more traditional methods, such as
search warrants or wiretaps, instead they have employed an undercover operation."2
II.

THE IMPACT OF UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS ON PERSONAL PRIVACY

A significant price is paid for the success of undercover opera27.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 11.
28. Id.
29. Such police activity is not dissimilar to the techniques sanctioned by the
Court in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (building
inspections); or United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (roadside stops
for enforcement of immigration laws).
30. Once criminals know that the police engage in undercover operations, a deterrent effect will result since any willing criminal could be an undercover agent.
31. Moore, supra note 25, at 37, upon noticing this phenomenon wrote, "In effect, informants and undercover operations tend to blur the distinction between detecting and investigating offenses: They happen almost simultaneously."
32. At least two academics have argued that the police may have turned to undercover operations to avoid the constraints on other types of police work. Duke,
Entrapment Defense Languishes in Permanent State of Confusion, NAT. L.J. Mar.
21, 1983, at 30, col. 1; Marx, Who Really Gets Stung? Some Issues Raised by the New
Police Undercover Work, in ABSCAM ETHICS, supra note 19, at 68. Both authors argue
that an implicit swap has occurred; by limiting coercion, the Court has increased the
use of deception.
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tions in detecting and investigating consensual crimes. The use of
informants, electronic surveillance, and deception, while solving the
detection and investigation problems, seriously intrudes upon personal privacy. Thus, society is faced with a dilemma. If it wishes to
fight consensual crimes effectively, it is forced to adopt intrusive
practices. Since the United States, through its local and federal law
enforcement agencies, has opted to attack the problem of victimless
crimes, appropriate limits must be placed on the police to safeguard
the privacy of the American people. Although many have turned to
the entrapment defense s ' or Congress 4 to develop these checks, the
constitutional limits on police activity should also be examined. The
fourth amendment is designed to control and limit the intrusiveness
of police practices on personal privacy. To understand the relationship between the fourth amendment and undercover operations,
however, the privacy interests affected by undercover operations
need first to be examined."'
Undercover operations are a direct assault on individual privacy. Indeed, they are useful because they allow the police to invade
the private sphere of an individual's life.3 ' Through undercover
work, an undercover agent becomes privy to information that only a
limited number of people know. For example, in Hoffa v. United
States,3 7 the police hired an undercover agent whom James Hoffa
knew because the police expected that Hoffa would trust him with
private information." As a result, the agent spent two months listening to Hoffa and his entourage plan activities which they believed would remain private.3 9 Of course, Hoffa took the chance that
someone would later turn state's witness or inform the police of his
illegal activities, but he never expected that an informant was in his
midst who from the beginning was planning to divulge all he was to
33. See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 1197 (evaluating the entrapment doctrine).
34. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT. supra note 26, at 25-29. Senator Charles Mathias
did introduce a bill during the 98th Congress based on the recommendations of the
FINAL REPORT.

S. 804, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129

CONG. REC.

S2797-2801 (daily ed.

Mar. 14, 1983). The proposed statute required that before an undercover operation
was commenced or expanded, a finding of reasonable suspicion was required. No judicial officers were involved in this process. The statute also adopted the objective definition of entrapment for federal crimes. The bill was never enacted.
35. This paper focuses exclusively on the effects of undercover operations on
privacy. The other significant costs of these operations, such as the resulting corruption of the police and the disrespect for a government whose officials violate the law,
are beyond the scope of this article.
36. One author captured the essence of undercover operations when he wrote,
"The very rationale for the use of undercover agents comes from a recognition of the
utility of invading private space in order to get valuable information." Levinson,
Under Cover: The Hidden Costs of Infiltration in ABSCAM ETHICS, supra note 19, at
51.
37. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
38. Id. at 298-99.
39. Id.
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hear.
The privacy of personal and professional relationships is violated when undercover operations are employed. Although the police
would not be allowed to sit in on personal or business conversations
if they asked, they are able to achieve the same result through an
undercover operation. In Lewis v. United States,"' an undercover
agent telephoned Lewis claiming that he was recommended by a colleague of Lewis. Had he knocked on Lewis' door with his uniform
on, asking for drugs, he most certainly would have been turned
down. However, since he was undercover, the agent was successful in
obtaining the incriminating evidence."'
The police investigating Lewis could have applied for a search
warrant or a wiretap, but either alternative would have required a
judicial determination of probable cause. Although an undercover
operation does not require such antecedent justification, the same
evidence is uncovered and the same intrusion into personal privacy
is achieved.42 Indeed, a Senate select committee which studied the
use of undercover operations concluded that such operations "affect
the same privacy interests as do physical searches and wiretaps."' 2
The Court has allowed the police to achieve by indirection what
cannot be achieved directly. The police may use chicanery and deceit to invade the privacy of individuals without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, yet they need to demonstrate probable cause
when the invasion of privacy is admitted to be the goal.
Because undercover operations are based on deceit, suspects
who are tested by them often feel betrayed and dehumanized." Deceit also manipulates people and creates situations which may never
have existed had the undercover operation not occurred. Like cogs
in a machine to be used in the way most satisfactory to the government, American citizens, at the whim of the police, may become
targets of undercover operations. For example, in On Lee v. United
States,'5 the petitioner was approached by a friend who was cooperating with the police. While the conversation was being taped without the knowledge of Mr. On Lee, the government agent elicited
many incriminating statements.4

Once people become aware that anyone could be an undercover
40. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
41. Id. at 207.
42. Of course, Lewis did "invite" the agent into his house, but that invitation
was premised on Lewis' belief that the agent was whom he was purported to be. Id.
43. FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 381.
44. One commentator has concluded that privacy "clearly encompasses the interest in being aware of all relevant characteristics of persons with whom one deals."
Dix, supra note 7, at 211.
45. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
46. Id. at 749.
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agent, the willingness of individuals to trust one another will be chilled. Moreover, because these operations are shrouded in secrecy,
people will tend to exaggerate the threats they pose. Thus, undercover operations will deter the formation of confidential, personal
and professional relationships. Justice Harlan recognized the significance of this result when he noted in United States v. White that
undercover operations "undermine that confidence and sense of security in dealing with one another that is characteristic of individual
relationships between citizens in a free society. ' 47 The United States

takes pride in its respect for the private lives of its people, yet by
sanctioning undercover operations without any constitutional controls, the Court has created a serious threat to this unique aspect of
American life."'
The effect of undercover operations on individual privacy can
be illustrated by the damage done to those individuals who are
drawn into an operation but do not fall prey to its temptations. 4'
Subjects of undercover work are likely to feel intimidated and
threatened long after their names have been cleared. Like the city
dweller whose apartment has been burglarized, an innocent subject
will feel that her privacy has been illegally invaded. In Abscam, at
least two Congressmen did not take the bait offered to them, yet
they continued "to feel guilty, compromised, distrustful and uncertain long after their names had been cleared. ''Bo
III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS

Although the privacy interests which are infringed upon by undercover operations are substantial, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to subject such operations to the constraints of the
fourth amendment." This refusal is surprising, given the Court's
conclusion that the purpose of the fourth amendment is "to safe47. 401 U.S. 745, 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 612-13 (3rd Cir. 1982) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (comparing the tactics used in Abscam to those of the Gestapo),
cert. denied, 457 U.S., 1106 (1982).
49. Although this is a result of any undercover work, there are now no procedural safeguards to reassure innocent subjects. For example, in Abscam there were no
prior warnings to possible subjects, the methods used to select suspects were questionable, and the FBI never issued public statements clearing the reputations of innocent suspects. Note, supra note 7, at 1215. Each of these safeguards is recommended
to limit the intrusion of undercover operations. See infra text accompanying notes
193-95.
50. Note, supra note 7, at 1215. Recognizing this effect, the Senate select committee which studied Abscam concluded that "the mere offer of a criminal temptation, even to a citizen who refused it, can. . . be very intrusive and harmful." FINAL
REPORT, supra note 26, at 382.
51. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 45 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
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guard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. '5 2 This section of the paper will trace
the Supreme Court's decisions which affect the relationship between
undercover operations and the fourth amendment, and argue that
the Court's refusal to apply the fourth amendment to undercover
operations is misguided given the privacy interests at stake and the
Court's general, flexible approach to the fourth amendment.
The Court's first foray into undercover operations held the challenged undercover operation unconstitutional and recognized that
privacy could be intruded upon by such police tactics. In Gouled v.
United States," the Supreme Court decided that an undercover
agent who gained entry to the petitioner's home by "stealth" and
surreptitiously removed some documents had violated the fourth
amendment. The Court spoke in broad language in holding this behavior unconstitutional: "These Amendments [the fourth and fifth]
should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by
them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by well-intentioned, but
mistakenly overzealous executive officers."5 The Court took a legal
realist approach to the practice at issue in Gouled. Since it reasoned
that the police could not have forced their way into the petitioner's
house and taken the papers with force, the Court held that the police could not achieve the same result by deceit."
The applicability of Gouled was drastically limited in the next
case that the Court decided concerning undercover techniques. In
On Lee v. United States, 6 the Supreme Court upheld the surreptitious recording57 of a conversation between the petitioner and an
undercover agent, who was a friend of Mr. On Lee. The agent was
able to obtain incriminating evidence because the petitioner mistakenly relied on the friendship between him and the agent.s The
Court reasoned that since there was no trespass by the agent and no
tort was committed, the fourth amendment was not violated."9 The
petitioner argued that Gouled prohibited the practice under review,
52. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
53. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
54. Id. at 304.
55. Id. at 305-06.
56. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
57. Many operations involve the use of electronic surveillance. Although the use
of such equipment arguably makes undercover work more intrusive, it is the argument of this paper that all undercover operations deceive, manipulate, and invade the
privacy of individuals. See supra text accompanying notes 33-50. While some members of the Court perceive a constitutional difference in the intrusiveness of undercover operations based on the use of electronic surveillance, the privacy of an individual isstill greatly infringed whether or not conversations are recorded.
58. On Lee, 343 U.S. at 749.
59. Id. at 750-53,
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but the Court limited the holding of that case to the seizure of "tangible property." 0 Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented to the Court's
approach, reasoning that undercover work constituted intrusion by
the police "into our daily lives against which the fourth amendment
of the constitution was set on guard." '
The Court's approach in On Lee and its interpretation of
Gouled are not surprising since the Court at that time was relying
on property and tort notions to define the boundaries of the fourth
amendment. The Court applied the same approach in its next case,
Lopez v. United States. 2 Although Mr. Lopez argued that the deception induced him to behave illegally, the Court, relying on On
Lee, held that there was no constitutional violation. "[The agent is]
not guilty of an unlawful invasion of petitioner's office simply because his apparent willingness to accept a bribe was not real." 8
Throughout its analysis of the facts and law in Lopez, the Court
refused to acknowledge any intrusion into privacy. 4
The Lopez Court did give special consideration to the use of the
concealed tape recorder." Although the opinion for the majority rejected all arguments that the recording was unconstitutional,"6 the
Court's reasoning hinted that its approach to the fourth amendment
was undergoing change. It held that "the risk that petitioner took in
offering a bribe to [agent] Davis fairly included the risk the offer
would be accurately produced in court, whether by faultless memory
or mechanical recording. 61 7 This approach begs the question, how-

ever, since Davis was never prepared to accept a bribe; he was
merely role-playing in order to obtain evidence against Lopez. If Lopez knew that Davis intended to reveal the illegal activity, he probably would not have acted as he did." More important is the question
of whether Lopez should be subjected to this risk, given its effect on
his privacy, without any police obligation to prove probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to a magistrate.6 9
60. Id. at 753.
61. Id. at 759 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
62. 373 U.S. 427 (1963). Mr. Lopez was accused of attempted bribery of an IRS
agent. The agent was not originally engaged in undercover work, but upon the offer of
a bribe, he assumed that role pursuant to Government instruction. He was also concealing a machine to record his conversations with Lopez. Id. at 429.
63. Id. at 438.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 438-39.
66. Id. at 440.
67. Id. at 439.
68. For example, he might have demanded reassurances from Davis and
searched him to guarantee that he was not bugged. The police relied on the fact that
Lopez would not contemplate this risk; otherwise, Davis may never have been
equipped with a recorder. Id. at 429.
69. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg, dissented and
argued that the fourth amendment "must embrace a concept of the liberty of one's
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The Supreme Court, on the same day in 1966, decided three
cases concerning the relationship between undercover operations
and the fourth amendment.70 Hoffa v. United States7' addressed the
constitutionality of employing an undercover agent whom the petitioner knew before and believed was a friend. Undercover agent Partin manipulated his way into the hotel suite where Hoffa was staying
during the pendency of a trial against him.7 ' The police believed

that Hoffa would attempt to bribe jurors during the pendency of
7
that trial; therefore, they hired Partin to spy on Hoffa's activities. 1
The petitioner argued that this behavior violated his fourth amendment rights since it constituted an illegal search for verbal evidence.74 Hoffa further contended that the consent to Partin's presence was based on Partin's presumed friendship, and the consent
75
was vitiated since he was a government agent.
The Court had little trouble finding this operation constitutional. Although the Court talked about protected areas, its holding
appears to be based on Hoffa's mistaken belief that Partin was his
friend.7 ' The Court emphasized that there is no constitutional violation when the police rely upon a suspect's "misplaced belief that a
person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."17 Throughout the decision the Court appeared preoccupied

with its readily apparent desire not to control undercover operations
with the fourth amendment.70 The desire to avoid placing restriccommunications, and historically it has." Id. at 438-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although he thought the tape recording made a constitutional difference, this paper has
rejected that distinction in its analysis in Part II and supra note 57. For further
criticism, see Grano, Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment
Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause and The Warrant Requirement, 69 J. CRIm. L. & C. 425, 435-38 (1978); Levinson, supra note 36, at 53-59. In
relying on the electronic surveillance, Justice Brennan was concerned about the slippery slope of intrusion as technology improves the ability of the police to monitor
individuals, yet he ignored the same problems with respect to deception as the police
improve those techniques. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Although the Supreme Court was still relying on the property approach, the
reasoning behind its decisions was more complex than that in On Lee and Lopez.
Realizing the inadequacy of its prior approach to the fourth amendment, the Court
began to place more emphasis on "misplaced confidence" and the need for undercover operations to combat crime. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
71. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
72. Id. at 296.
73. Id. at 299.
74. Id. at 300.
75. Id.
76. The Court held, "The petitioner, in a word, was not relying on the security
of the hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would
not reveal his wrongdoing." Id. at 302.
77. Id.
78. For example, the majority opinion concluded that "the use of secret informers is not per se unconstitutional." Id. at 311. But this was hardly the issue. The issue
was whether the requirements of the fourth amendment are applicable to undercover
operations.
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tions on undercover work became explicit in Lewis v. United
States. " In this case, the agent did not know the petitioner before
the undercover operation was launched.8 0 Instead, he telephoned the
petitioner claiming that he had been told Lewis could help him obtain drugs.81 Lewis did eventually sell drugs to the agent; as a result,
he was arrested and convicted. 2 After little discussion, the Court
held that the deception practiced did not violate the fourth amendment.83 Perhaps the most interesting part of this opinion, however,
is the following:
Were we to hold the deceptions of the agent in this case constitutionally prohibited, we would come near to a rule that the use of undercover agents in any manner is virtually unconstitutional per se. Such
a rule would, for example, severely hamper the Government in ferreting out those organized criminal activities that are characterized by
covert dealings with victims who either cannot or do not protest."4
This contention is plainly wrong. Undercover operations would not
be made unconstitutional; merely, such operations would become
subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment. Whether such
a result would hamper the government in law enforcement is irrelevant. The Constitution cannot be ignored simply because its commands are inconvenient.
The last case of this trilogy is perhaps the most interesting. In
Osborn v. United States,88 a private detective, Vick, was asked by
the petitioner to bribe some jurors. When Vick informed the Department of Justice of this request, federal officials applied to two
judges sitting together for permission to wire Vick so that his next
encounter with the petitioner could be recorded." After receiving
permission from the judges, Vick recorded his conversations with
Osborn on two occasions.87 In holding that there was no constitutional violation in this case, the Court emphasized that it did not
need to rely on Lopez or On Lee.18 Rather, given the unique situation of prior judicial approval based on antecedent justification, the
79. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
80. Id. at 207.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 208.
83. The Court compared the facts here to those in Gouled. Finding the factual
situations totally different, the Court held there was not a constitutional violation. Id.
at 212.
84. Id. at 210.
85. 385 U.S. 323 (1966). The only issue in this case was the admissibility of the
tape recording transcript. The petitioner did not challenge the testimony of Vick. Id.
at 326.
86. Id. at 325.
87. Id. at 325-26. Permission was obtained separately for each encounter. The
Court did not say what standard the authorizing judges applied to the request to
record. Id.
88. Id. at 327.
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Court relied on the "precise and discriminate" use of electronic sur-

veillance.89 The Court also emphasized that the surveillance was allowed "for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the
truth of the affidavit's allegation."'
The irony of Osborn is that the facts and the Court's holding
directly contradict the Court's conclusion in Lewis that all undercover operations, if subjected to the requirements of the fourth
amendment, would be unconstitutional. Osborn illustrates that undercover operations and the fourth amendment are not incompatible. The fourth amendment can be applied to control the infringement of undercover operations on personal privacy as it has been
with search warrants.9 1
The Hoffa and Lewis decisions are troubling because they fail
to recognize the privacy interests at stake: the importance of nondeceptive personal and business relationships, the intrusiveness of
undercover operations, and the effects of manipulation and deceit.
In his dissent, Justice Douglas recognized these consequences.92
Foreshadowing the holding in Katz, he also criticized the "misplaced confidence" rationale since it ignored the different risks one
takes in divulging personal information:
A householder who admits a government agent, knowing that he is
such, waives of course any right of privacy. One who invites or admits
an old "friend" takes, I think, the risk that the "friend" will tattle
...
The case for me, however, is different when government plays
an ignoble role of "planting" an agent in one's living room or uses
fraud and deception in getting him there. These practices are at war
with the constitutional standards of privacy which are parts of our
choicest tradition. 9
Justice Douglas reasoned that the fraud and deceit practiced in
Hoffa and Lewis were analogous to that of the agent in Gouled, and
were thus unconstitutional since there was no antecedent
justification. 4
89. Id. at 329.
90. Id. at 329-30.
91. Even the Court's language in Osborn directly contradicted the quoted language from Lewis. For example, the Court concluded that the facts "could hardly be
a clearer example of 'the precedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate
that is central to the Fourth Amendment.'" Id. at 330 (citations omitted).
92. He wrote, "These federal cases present various aspects of the constitutional
right of privacy . . . [and] demonstrate an alarming trend whereby the privacy and
dignity of our citizens is being whittled away." Id. at 341-43 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 347.
94. He also suspected that the police had used undercover operations to avoid
the requirements of the fourth amendment. He characterized the government's behavior as "lawless invasion[s] of privacy," arguing that "[wihere, as here, there is
enough evidence to get a warrant to make a search I would not allow the fourth
amendment to be short-circuited ....

We downgrade the fourth amendment when

we forgive noncompliance with its mandate and allow these easier methods of the
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Not until 1971 was the Supreme Court faced with another case
concerning the relationship between the fourth amendment and undercover operations. Between 1966 and 1971, however, the Court's
approach to the fourth amendment experienced significant change.
Katz v. United States,9 5 Terry v. Ohio,96 and Camara v. Municipal
7 radically altered the Court's fourth
Court of San Francisco"
amendment jurisprudence with significant implications for its approach to undercover operations.
In Katz, the Court largely abandoned its property rationale for
the fourth amendment. Instead, it embraced an analysis which emphasized the expectations of individuals.98 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, which has been the approach followed by the Court,"
advocated a two-prong test to determine whether the fourth amendment was applicable: first, whether the individual had a subjective
expectation of privacy; and second, whether society was willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable.' 0 After holding the fourth
amendment applicable in Katz,10 1 the Court found the search unconstitutional since there had been no prior, independent review by
a magistrate.102 The Court held that the absence of the "detached
scrutiny" of a magistrate and the lack of limits established in advance resulted in a violation of the fourth amendment.'0 3
In the same year that Katz was decided, the Court created a
new area of fourth amendment law: administrative searches. In
Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,'° ' the Court examined the constitutionality of warrantless searches to ensure compliance with San Francisco's housing code' 05 and held that these adpolice to thrive." Id. at 344-46.

95. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
96. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
97. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
98. 389 U.S. at 359.
99. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (adopting Justice Harlan's analysis in Katz).
100. While easily stated, Justice Harlan's "reasonable expectations of privacy"
approach moves the Court into murky waters. In deciding fourth amendment cases,
the Court must now make value judgments about what expectations of privacy are
appropriate for our society. See infra text accompanying notes 140-41.
101. For a discussion of the factors which led the Court to this conclusion, see
infra text accompanying notes 150-51.
102. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
103. The Court concluded, "In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has
never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to
find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the
least intrusive means consistent with that end." Id. at 356-57.
104. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
105. The Court framed the issue narrowly. It was not whether the public interest justified the search but "whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a
warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the government purpose behind the search." Id. at 533.
Compare this language with the Court's conclusion in Lewis, supra text accompany-
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ministrative searches were subject to the fourth amendment.10, In
reaching this decision, the Court noted that homeowners under the
current system were subject to the unfettered discretion of government inspectors. 107 This result, the Court emphasized, "is precisely
the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently
circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant
the need to search." ' The majority opinion also rejected the respondent's argument that statutory109safeguards were an adequate
substitute for individualized review.
While the Court agreed that the searches were subject to the
commands of the fourth amendment, it did not adopt the typical
probable cause requirement. Rather, it articulated a new test to determine what standard a search must satisfy before it will be
deemed constitutional: "There can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails."' 10 After balancing the governmental and personal interests at stake in Camara,"' the Court
held that these searches would be permissible if executed pursuant
to "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting
an area inspection."1 12 The Court recognized that administrative
searches would not be based on the knowledge of defects in a specific building but on such neutral factors as the passage of time since
the last search, the type of building being inspected, or general conditions in an area.113
The Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio1 4 added further flexibility and complexity to fourth amendment jurisprudence. In this case,
the Court held that a "stop and frisk" 1 ' by a police officer was subing note 84.
106. In reaching this conclusion, the Court overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360 (1959), which held that these searches were not affected by the Constitution.
Camara,387 U.S. at 539.
107. 387 U.S. at 531.
108. Id. at 533.
109. Id. at 532-33.
110. Id. at 536-37.
111. The Court found three factors supporting the government's need to conduct administrative searches: (1) a long history of acceptance; (2) a strong public
need to search since that strategy was universally recognized as the only effective way
to ensure compliance with housing codes; and (3) only a limited invasion of privacy
since the inspections are not "personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime." Id. at 537.
112. Id. at 538.
113. Notice that these factual predicates do not establish any reason to suspect
that violations were occurring. The Court assumed that violations existed, but required that searches be based on neutral standards in an attempt to limit the discretion of government officials to search. Id. at 538.
114. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
115. A "stop and frisk" is defined in Terry as "a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing ...

in an attempt to discover weapons ....

392 U.S. at 30.
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ject to the fourth amendment because it was an invasion of privacy
which "may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment.' 1 6

Nevertheless, the Warrant Clause of the fourth amendment was
held inapplicable.' 17 Instead, the Court maintained that the practice
must be tested against the fourth amendment's proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures.118 In Terry, a majority of the
Court concluded that a "stop and frisk" would satisfy constitutional
requirements only if it passed a reasonable suspicion test with "specific reasonable inferences," not "inchoate and unparticularized"

hunches. " 9 Thus, as it did in Camara,the Court allowed an invasion
of privacy only when antecedent justification existed. 20 As it did in
its past decisions, the Court emphasized the importance of subjecting the officer's behavior "to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of
a judge." ' 1
In United States v. White,'22 the Supreme Court again faced
the question of the constitutionality of undercover operations. In
this case, an agent who had monitored conversations between the
petitioner and a wired undercover agent testified in court about the
content of those conversations.'
The plurality opinion is rather
confused and confusing. Although the Court applied the reasoning
of Katz to the case, the opinion suggested that this approach was

only dicta because in Desist v. United States2 " the Court had held
that Katz only applied to electronic surveillance occurring after
Katz was decided. Indeed, a majority of the Court agreed to the re2 5
sult in White based solely on the holding in Desist."

The plurality opinion indicates, however, that at least four justices did not believe that Katz had any effect on the constitutionality of undercover operations. These justices continued to rely on the
applicability of Hoffa, Lewis, Lopez, and On Lee, all of which, they
116. Id. at 17.
117. Id. at 20.
118. In making this determination, the Court applied the Camara balancing
test. The Court characterized the invasion as follows: "A severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening,
and perhaps humiliating experience." Id. at 24-25. The search was justified, however,
because of the importance of preventing crimes and avoiding the killing of police
officers. Id.
119. Id. at 27.
120. The Court did not require that the police officer obtain judicial approval
before the search due to the exigent circumstances, yet the justification of the stop
and frisk was to be based only on what the officer observed before he invaded the
privacy of the suspect. Id. at 20-22.
121. Id. at 21.
122. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
123. Id. at 746. The conversations occurred before the Supreme Court had decided Katz.
124. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
125. Justice Brennan, concurring in the result, based his opinion on Desist.
Thus, when he- is added to the four in the plurality, a majority emerges.
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contended, were not disturbed by Katz. 2 The opinion concluded
that the police activity was constitutional because "[i]nescapably,
one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his
companions may be reporting to the police.' 127 The plurality based

its holding on the reliability and relevance of the information being
challenged.128 Once again at least four justices wanted to avoid
"erect[ing] constitutional barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is also accurate and reliable."' 2 9
There are numerous problems with the plurality's approach to
the fourth amendment. The very wording of the White decision is
problematic. The Constitution does not merely protect innocent citizens, it protects all citizens.3 0 To state that those who contemplate
illegal activities do not enjoy the same protection as do others is
inaccurate.' 3 ' Thus, the opinion, if accurate, means that no one, regardless of the activity contemplated, has any constitutional claim
when her privacy is infringed upon by an undercover operation. Because undercover operations affect not only those guilty of crimes,
these justices sanctioned enormous intrusions into privacy. If the
opinion did not contemplate this result, then its conclusion is invalid, because the Constitution will not countenance one rule for the
innocent and one for the guilty. Moreover, in reaching its conclusion, the plurality, as Justice Harlan indicated in dissent,'32 ignored
the various privacy interests which are infringed upon by undercover operations and which, according to Katz and Camara, should
be considered.
These justices also refused to frame the issue narrowly as the
3 Instead, they assumed
Court had done in Camara.1
that any application of the fourth amendment would destroy the utility of undercover operations. This conclusion is particularly troubling after
Terry and Camara, in which activities never before subject to the
fourth amendment were brought within its confines.' 3 4 There has
never been any suggestion that either decision destroyed the ability
of the police to "stop and frisk," or government inspectors to conduct administrative searches. Why should undercover operations be
treated differently? Merely because an undercover operation creates
126. White, 394 U.S. at 749.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 753-54.
129. Id. at 753.
130. In his dissent, Justice Harlan recognized this flaw in the plurality's opinion: "Interposition of a warrant requirement is designed not to shield 'wrongdoers,'
but to secure a measure of privacy and a sense of personal security throughout our
society." Id. at 790 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
131. But see Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986).
132. See infra text accompanying notes 135-44.
133. See supra note 105.

134. White, 401 U.S. at 761.
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reliable evidence does not suggest that it should not be subject to
the Constitution; indeed, this factor is entirely irrelevant. Searches
and wiretaps also create reliable evidence. They are, however, regulated by the fourth amendment because they infringe on privacy.
The same is true of undercover operations. 35
Justice Harlan dissented to the plurality opinion, and his opinion is an eloquent defense of the right to privacy and the need to
protect that right by regulating undercover operations."3 ' He began
his dissent by discussing the Court's new flexibility in fourth amendment jurisprudence as well as its broader scope. 3 7 According to Justice Harlan, by 1971, the fourth amendment protected not property,
but privacy, including verbal communications.'
The opinion also
highlighted the continued importance to the Court of antecedent
justification and the review of a detached magistrate.'
Justice Harlan recognized, however, that the Court's new expectations or risk analysis approach could "ultimately lead to the substitution of words for analysis."" 0 The Court's job, therefore, was to
determine what expectations and risks were entitled to the protection of the fourth amendment. By expanding upon the Camara test,
Justice Harlan captured the difficulty of the Court's responsibility
and ably summarized the Court's duty:
The analysis must .. .transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk .... [Thus], [t]his

question must be answered by assessing the nature of a particular
practice and the likely extent of its impact upon the individual's sense
135. In dissent, Justice Douglas recognized that the evolution in the Court's
fourth amendment jurisprudence since On Lee mandated a rethinking of the relationship between the Constitution and undercover operations. He argued that the decisions in Terry, Katz, and Camara "have moved [the Court] far away from the rationale of On Lee and Lopez and only a retrogressive step of large dimensions would
bring us back to it." White, 401 U.S. at 761. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
136. The opinion is even more extraordinary since it marks a change in Justice
Harlan's approach to the fourth amendment. He wrote the opinion in Lopez, yet in
this dissent he implicitly recognizes that this decision was no longer good law given
the Court's decisions in Terry, Camara, and Katz. White, 401 U.S. at 788 n.24
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 769 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 781 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
139. Justice Harlan noted that Camara reaffirmed the principle "that it was
against the possible arbitrariness of invasion that the fourth amendment with its warrant machinery was meant to guard." Id. at 782. Given the Court's decision in Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), Justice Harlan concluded that warrants can only be
excused in extraordinary circumstances, none of which were present in White. White,
401 U.S. at 795 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
140. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan continued,
"Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that
translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present. Since it is the
task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as
judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of
saddling them upon society." Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique
of law enforcement. For those more extensive intrusions that significantly jeopardize the sense of security which is the paramount concern of fourth amendment liberties, I am of the view that more than
self-restraint by law enforcement officials is required and at the least
warrants should be necessary.'"
In applying this test to the undercover operation in White, Justice Harlan concluded that the fourth amendment was applicable.14

He noted that the result of uncontrolled undercover operations
would chill personal and business relationships which are basic to a
free society.14 A warrant requirement, therefore, was needed to protect the openness of American society and to ensure that privacy
was invaded only in limited circumstances.""

IV.

TOWARDS A "REASONABLE"

FOURTH AMENDMENT APPROACH

To

UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS

A.

The Applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Undercover
Operations

Since 1971, the Court has not addressed the relevance of the
fourth amendment to undercover operations. Given the lack of
agreement in White and the Court's continued flexibility in interpreting the fourth amendment,"' a constitutional challenge to undercover operations may be successful. The Court, however, refused
to grant certiorari'4 in any of the Abscam cases, 4 7 and the lower

courts dismissed any fourth amendment arguments by a quick citation to White.'4" In addition, the Court's recent unwillingness to rethink the entrapment defense certainly does not suggest it would be
141. Id. at 786-87 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Once again, electronic surveillance was the issue, but the privacy interests identified by Justice Harlan are equally applicable to
undercover operations in general.
143. Much of Justice Harlan's argument on this point echoed the concerns
raised in Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 477-79
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
144. White, 401 U.S. at 781 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
145. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975).
146. Note, supra note 7, at 1193 n.5.
147. Abscam involved an extended undercover operation by the FBI into political corruption of United States Congressmen and Senators. The investigation began,
however, as an operation to recover stolen property. For a detailed discussion of the
operation, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 56-324; Nathan, ABSCAM: A Fair
and Effective Method for Fighting Public Corruption, in ABSCAM ETHICS, supra note
19, at 1-16.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 620 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983).
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receptive to a constitutional attack on undercover operations."'
Nevertheless, based on the privacy interests at stake and the
Court's opinions in other fourth amendment contexts, the Court
should decide that undercover operations must satisfy the requirements of the fourth amendment. American citizens should not be
forced to measure their every word fearing that anyone could be an
undercover agent. This is not a risk that people assume nor should
have to assume. The costs of undercover operations on human dignity also mandate that the government prove that such tactics satisfy constitutional demands. As Justice Harlan advocated in his dissent in White, the effect on a democratic society in chilling personal
and business relationships is significant. 50
The Court would not be departing from the fourth amendment
jurisprudence it developed since Katz by concluding that undercover operations are controlled by the fourth amendment. For example, in Katz the Court concluded that when one makes a telephone
call he attempts to exclude eavesdroppers and assumes the phone is
not wired, yet in the undercover context, one assumes that the undercover agent is really a friend or a business associate. The same
privacy values and implications for democratic society are affected
by either governmental tactic, but the Court, so far, has only given
protection to the former. What the Court ignores in the latter are
largely intangible values such as the assumption of good faith between people and the harmful effects of deception. Indeed, the misplaced confidence rationale of these decisions ignores the deliberate
penetration of privacy by the government.
In Terry, the Court was concerned with the brief but serious
intrusion into privacy of a "stop and frisk." '' The Court measured
the seriousness of this intrusion largely by examining the likely reaction of an individual who had been frisked."5' A person who has
been manipulated by an undercover operation, however, is also
likely to feel resentment and anger that the police have intruded on
her privacy. Indeed, we have already seen that the effect of Abscam
upon innocent subjects was substantial. 5 3 There is no reason to
doubt that all undercover operations will engender "strong resentment" and "arouse great indignity.' ' 5 Moreover, the invasion in
149.

See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v.

Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). Of course, the two areas, entrapment and the warrant
requirement, focus on different aspects of police practices. The former is concerned
with the mens rea of the defendant, while the latter focuses on the justification required before the police may engage in certain activities.
150.

White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

151. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
152. Id. at 21-22.
153. See supra note 50.
154. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
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Terry was brief, yet an undercover operation, as evidenced in Hoffa,
may last for months. Thus, if the Court remains concerned with the
same factors considered relevant in Terry, it should hold that undercover operations are controlled by the fourth amendment.
Like housing inspections before Camara, undercover operations
may currently be launched without any antecedent justification or
review by a neutral magistrate. This uncontrolled discretion to invade privacy greatly disturbed the Court in Camara, however, and
led it to conclude that administrative searches must satisfy the
fourth amendment warrant requirement. " There is no principled
reason why the Court should not reach the same conclusion with
respect to undercover operations. The invasion of privacy caused by
undercover work is at least as significant, and arguably more so,
than that caused by administrative searches. In addition, unlike administrative searches, undercover operations possess the "additional
odious characteristic that the target does not even know that he is
seized by the state, his reactions probed and his words marked."' 0
It is possible that the Court has not held the fourth amendment
applicable to undercover operations because the testimony of friends
or co-conspirators who turn against their peers is universally recognized as constitutionally valid. There is, however, a significant difference between a friend who, on her own, turns against a defendant
and an undercover agent who is placed in a person's midst by the
government. The risk and the effect on individuals are different
when the government plays an active role in creating the situation.
17
The Court recognized this difference in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inic. '

That case involved the constitutionality of warrantless OSHA
searches for safety hazards. 1 8 The government contended that since
an employee can report OSHA violations, a government agent
should also be allowed to enter without a warrant to inspect for such
violations.' 59 The Court rejected this argument because of the differences between employees and government agents.6 0 While the
Court recognized that an employee could report whatever he saw to
the government, the opinion concluded that a government inspector
"is not an employee."'' The same analysis should be applied to un155. 387 U.S. at 528.
156. Note, supra note 8, at 1011.
157. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
158. Id. at 309.
159. Id. at 311.
160. Id. at 322-23.
161. The Court concluded:
The owner of a business has not, by the necessary utilization of employees in his operation, thrown open the areas where employees alone are
permitted to the warrantless scrutiny of Government agents. That an
employee is free to report, and the government is free to use, any evidence of noncompliance with OSHA that the employee observes fur-
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dercover agents. Although a friend or co-conspirator can betray another's confidences, an undercover agent is not a friend or a co-conspirator. The Court's decision in Marshall implicitly assumes that
the government agent could not have pretended to be an employee
and obtained the desired information in that fashion; if that were
allowed, the opinion would make no sense because the same privacy
interests would have been infringed.'
The academic literature on entrapment and undercover operations is in unanimous agreement that significant privacy interests
are affected by the use of such tactics.'"3 The Senate investigation
into undercover techniques conducted after Abscam also concluded
that it was "beyond dispute that undercover operations can and do
invade legitimate privacy interests in significant ways."' 64 The Senate committee further recognized that undercover tactics undermine
the trust and goodwill which is essential to interpersonal dealings in
a free society.""6 If Justice Harlan was correct that the Katz approach requires an analysis of what police tactics are appropriate in
a democratic society, 66 the committee's findings should be strong
evidence that our society does value the privacy interests affected by
undercover operations.'67
The Court may still be concerned that placing a warrant requirement on undercover operations would destroy their utility.
However, this argument, as we have seen, is simply incorrect. A warrant requirement would only regulate undercover operations; it
would not destroy them. Just as search warrants and wiretaps,
which are controlled by the fourth amendment, remain widely used,
there is no reason to believe that undercover work would not continue to be employed. Indeed, the use of that tactic would be fairer
and less intrusive on privacy if controlled by the fourth amendment.
Moreover, given current law, the police may attempt to circumvent
the warrant requirement for searches and wiretaps by engaging in
undercover operations. Thus, based on the significant privacy interests at stake and the Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence, undercover operations should be subject to the commands of the
nishes no justification for federal agents to enter a place of business
from which the public is restricted and to conduct their own warrantless
search.
Id. at 315.
162. Of course, the government agent does not become an employee just by pretending to be one. See Grano, supra note 69, at 435.
163. See supra notes 7-8.
164. FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 381. Notice that the committee's language
is very similar to that used in Katz, "reasonable expectations of privacy."
165. Id. at 382.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
167. Certainly the representative branch of our government is better equipped
than the Court to determine what expectations of privacy are "reasonable."
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fourth amendment.
B.

A ConstitutionalStandard for Undercover Operations

To develop the appropriate standard for determining the constitutionality of undercover operations, the Camara balancing test
must be applied. There can be little doubt that both the governmental and personal interests are very strong. Like administrative
searches, the government needs undercover tactics to fight consensual crimes effectively.'" 8 On the other hand, undercover tactics seriously intrude upon privacy. In the proper situation, however, there
is little doubt that an undercover operation is reasonable. To determine what test the government must satisfy before an undercover
operation should be held reasonable, the different types of undercover operations must be examined separately because each is used
for different purposes and at different stages of the criminal investigatory process.
1. Targeted Undercover Operations
Similar in function to searches or wiretaps, targeted undercover'
operations are primarily used to obtain enough evidence against a
suspect so that the police may arrest him. A probable cause standard for this type of undercover work would be logical given the
analogy to searches; however, because of the nature of consensual
crimes, a reasonable suspicion standard is more appropriate. 6 9 As
previously discussed, it is very difficult to obtain evidence concerning consensual crimes. 1 " Thus, a probable cause standard may very
well destroy the utility of targeted undercover operations.' While
the privacy interests affected by these operations are significant,
they are not strong enough to overwhelm the utility of undercover
2
operations.1

168. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
169. Of course, the probable cause standard could be interpreted more leniently
in cases involving undercover tactics. This could, however, have a deleterious effect
on the integrity of the probable cause requirement. But cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213 (1983) (two-pronged test for determining whether an informant's tip establishes
probable cause for issuance of a warrant was abandoned in favor of the totality of the
circumstances approach).
170. For a discussion' of this issue, see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying
text.
171. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 7, at 220; Note, supra note 7, at 1216.
172. The choice of a standard to evaluate the constitutionality of an undercover
operation is not an easy one. A strong argument could be made that a reasonable
suspicion standard is inappropriate because the invasion of privacy resulting from
undercover work is great in contrast to the brief and relatively insignificant intrusion
of a "stop and frisk." Moreover, the safety of a police officer is not an issue here as it
was in Terry. Nevertheless, this paper has argued that the very nature of consensual
crimes is their secrecy and resistance to detection. Thus, a faithful application of the
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There should be little concern that the reasonable suspicion
standard is too stringent. Whenever the Court has been faced with
an invasion of privacy which is targeted at specific individuals and
based on the discretion of the officer in the field, it has required, at
a minimum, that the police be able to point to articulable facts
which support the inference that illegal activity is being conducted." 3 In addition to the frequent scholarly articles written advocating a reasonable suspicion standard, the Senate select committee concluded that a reasonable suspicion standard should be
applied. 7 '
The reasonable suspicion test would require the police to show
that there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect is engaged in, was engaged in, or is likely to engage in criminal activities.'"7 To be an effective check against police misconduct, this standard must be applied before the undercover operation is launched
and evaluated by a neutral magistrate.' s Both requirements are
consistent with the Court's protection of fourth amendment
rights
177
as evidenced in its decisions in Camara and its progeny.
Although not free from ambiguity, the reasonable suspicion
standard should be a workable standard which magistrates can supervise. The application for an undercover warrant would first need
to state the basis for believing that reasonable suspicion exists. For
example, reasonable suspicion certainly existed in Osborn once Vick
informed the federal agents of Osborn's proposal. The same is true
of Hoffa once one of the jurors had informed the judge that he had
been offered a bribe. Less obvious cases can also be posited. For example, reasonable suspicion would exist to suspect that a putative
member of a criminal organization was engaged in illegal activity
based on the divergence between her reported income and her lifestyle, her association with known criminals, and the claims of informants. Depending on the crime involved and the substantiality of
the evidence offered, any of the three factors or all three combined
probable cause standard would practically preclude the use of undercover operations
to detect victimless crimes. This police practice, however, has been the most effective
means to combat consensual crimes. See supra text accompanying note 27. In actuality, the need to fight consensual crimes effectively is the crutch relied upon to lower
the constitutional test to one of reasonable suspicion.
173. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973).

174.

FINAL REPORT,

175.

Id.

supra note 26, at 28.

176. Of course, the usual exceptions for exigent circumstances would apply.
177. Although the Court in Martinez-Fuerte determined that a warrant was not
required, the reasoning of that decision is not applicable here. 428 U.S. at 565. See
infra text accompanying note 190 for a discussion of the Court's conclusion in Martinez- Fuerte that a warrant was not required.
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could show reasonable suspicion. For example, if the target is suspected of counterfeiting and the police can point to a divergence
between reported and actual incomes, reasonable suspicion may exist. Moreover, the reliability of the evidence need not be as strong as
is demanded for probable cause. Thus, if the police base the application on information from an informant, the standard requirements
for reliability should be relaxed.
The fourth amendment also demands that the warrant satisfy
the requirements of particularity with respect to the crime for which
the target is suspected and the structure and strategy of the proposed undercover operation.178 Both of these requirements are essential to guarantee the manageability of the warrant process; without them, a suspect has no basis for challenging the legality of the
operation and the magistrate has little ability to evaluate the legitimacy of the alleged deficiencies. Of course, in reviewing challenges
to the strategy employed, a magistrate must be mindful of the necessities of undercover operations and apply a flexible review. Significant changes in strategy or targets, however, should not be tolerated. Thus, if the warrant asked for permission to plan an encounter
between the suspect and an undercover agent whom the suspect did
not know, a magistrate should not allow that warrant to sanction the
use of a friend or employee as the undercover agent. Because the
intrusion on privacy is greater in the latter situation, the reasonable
suspicion requirement would require a stronger factual predicate
before authorizing that type of operation. 7 Nevertheless, just as in
the Court's existing jurisprudence, undercover agents must be able
to respond to exigent circumstances and the course of the operation.
The price for disobeying the commands of the warrant must be
the exclusion of evidence. This result is consistent with the Court's
jurisprudence and is supported by the same considerations which
led to the adoption of the exclusionary rule. 8 Consequently, if a
suspect alleges in a pretrial motion that the police have not complied with the warrant and he is successful, the evidence resulting
from that operation must be excluded in any subsequent trial.''
178. U.S.

CONST. amend IV.
179. The same analysis would apply if stronger inducements than originally
contemplated in the warrant were employed.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Mapp v. United
States, 425 U.S. 978 (1976).
181. Of course, the entire jurisprudence of the exclusionary rule must be
adopted. Thus, Leon and Gates would apply, at least in federal court. Other remedies, such as an action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may also be available, but the
deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule supports the adoption of the rule in this
context. A discussion of the relative merits of the exclusionary rule, now a highly
controversial subject, is beyond the scope of this article.
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2.

Police Encouragement and the Fourth Amendment

Non-targeted Undercover Operations

This type of undercover work is employed to patrol for, detect,
and deter the commission of consensual crimes. While the intrusion
involved is equivalent to that in targeted operations, the possible
factual predicate which can reasonably be expected to justify the
operation cannot be as substantial. 182 In a similar context, the Court
in Camara did not require that there be any evidence that a housing
code was being violated; it merely demanded that procedures be
adopted to limit the discretion of the inspector.'
In subsequent
cases, the Court has even excused the warrant requirement in administrative searches when discretion is limited. 8 " Nevertheless, a
warrant requirement based on reasonable suspicion should be demanded before the police may begin a non-targeted undercover
operation. 8 5
Unlike the search for housing code violations in Camara or the
fixed checkpoints aimed at discovering illegal aliens in Martinez-Fuerte, the privacy interests affected by non-targeted operations are
significant. Moreover, the invasion of privacy is not lessened because
the discretion of the field officer is limited. Of course, the ability of
the officer to misuse his authority is checked, yet this element of
control does not lessen the effect on privacy. The Camara balancing
test mandates, therefore, that a reasonable suspicion test based on
articulable facts suggesting that crimes are being committed be
adopted. A plan limiting discretion of field officers and based on
neutral factors will not be sufficient."8 '
The factual support for a non-targeted operation, given its
objectives, will be less specific than that for a targeted operation.
For example, a sting operation would be justified upon the showing
that many robberies had been committed within a certain locality.
The FBI's undercover operation entitled "Lobster" was based on
this predicate. 8 7 The FBI and the Massachusetts state police, reacting to a spate of truck hijackings, successfully penetrated criminal
182. If the police knew who were committing consensual crimes, a non-targeted
operation would be unnecessary. This type of undercover operation is employed to
determine who is breaking the law, not to ascertain whether a specific individual is a
criminal.
183. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-39.
184. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
185. Once again, this is the standard the FINAL REPORT advocated. See supra
note 26, at 28.
186. This conclusion obviously is dependent upon the analysis in the preceding
section of the paper concerning targeted undercover operations. Since there is no difference between the two with respect to the governmental or personal interests at
stake, the same standard should be applied regardless of the nature of the operation.
By necessity, of course, the facts which will satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard
for the two categories will differ.
187. FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 339-44.
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operations and uncovered significant criminal activity. 88 An operation like Abscam could be justified by a showing of recent convictions of politicians for corruption. For example, an undercover operation launched in New York City to root out corruption would
satisfy the reasonable suspicion test by detailing the recent indictments and convictions of city officials. Such an operation could also
be justified by suspicious tax returns by numerous members of Congress. If, for example, many Congressmen reported significant consulting incomes which went unexplained in their tax returns, the requirements of the reasonable suspicion standard would be
fulfilled."8 9 The same requirements of particularity with respect to
scope and strategy as were demanded for targeted operations should
be established for these operations as well.
Because of the privacy interests at stake, antecedent justification through a warrant procedure should be required. Although the
Court in Martinez-Fuerte decided not to require a warrant,' 90 none
of the considerations which led to that conclusion are relevant here.
The invasion of privacy by undercover operations is considerable, it
is crucial "to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of reasonableness," and the judgment of the magistrate is relevant.' 9' Indeed, the Court's decision in Martinez-Fuertewas an aberration; in
all other relevant contexts, the Court has uniformly demanded that
a warrant issue before a search may occur.192
Other factors may dictate caution however. As with wiretapping, the warrant requirement may provide little more than an appearance of legitimacy to undercover operations. If a magistrate will
be overwhelmed by the evidence generated and the complexity of
the operation, meaningful review may not be possible. Although it
will not be a simple task for a magistrate to review police activity
which has been authorized by an undercover warrant, the responsibility should not be overwhelming. The police must confine their activities to those authorized in the warrant. While a reviewing magistrate may allow for some flexibility in the techniques actually
employed, it should not be an impossible chore to determine what
behavior is unacceptable after examining the warrant. In addition,
the crime being investigated is limited to what is detailed in the
warrant.
No contention is made, however, that the warrant procedure
188. By all accounts, Lobster was a model undercover operation. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 339-44.

189. Many more examples could be posited; for more possibilities, see Note,
supra note 7, at 1223.
190. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 565-66.
191. Id.
192. See supra note 1.
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will be uniformly successful in constraining the police or that it will
always provide for meaningful review by a magistrate. Nevertheless,
the warrant requirement should enable a magistrate to review challenged undercover techniques frequently enough to merit its adoption. Moreover, a warrant requirement will require the police to
prove reasonable suspicion before an undercover investigation is
commenced.
There are at least two serious problems with sanctioning undercover operations on the basis of such a broad factual predicate. A
non-targeted operation, by definition, will invade the reasonable expectations of privacy of individuals who are not suspected of criminal activity and who are probably law-abiding citizens. The reasonable suspicion standard somewhat tempers this result. If a subject
does not respond to the inducement after a reasonable period of
time, the operation must move on to the next member of the group.
However, the innocent suspect will still be resentful and feel
manipulated by the experience. Also, depending on the operation,
additional harms could be inflicted.
These consequences can and should be mitigated by the adoption of several prophylactic procedures. For example, notice should
be given, whenever feasible, to possible targets informing them that
they may be chosen, based solely on their membership in a relevant
group, as subjects in a future operation. 9 ' The notice should also be
provided to the press so that the public will understand that individuals will not be selected because they are suspected of crimes. To
avoid tipping their hat, the police should provide notice to as broad
a group as possible. For example, in Abscam, the FBI would have
notified not only all Congressmen but also all senior executive officials. These notices should also inform the possible suspects of the
relevant law.
Another feature which would minimize the intrusiveness of
these undercover operations is random selection of suspects. Abscam
is particularly lacking in this regard since the FBI agents relied on
underworld figures to bring them the Congressmen.' 94 Once an undercover operation has concluded, the police should, as soon as possible, release the names of those group members who were investigated by the operation but proven to be law-abiding.
The second major failing of non-targeted operations is that they
move quickly from being non-targeted to targeted. For example,
once a randomly selected suspect responds to the bait, the police
193. Others have also advocated a notice requirement. See, e.g., Sherman supra
note 23, at 130-31.
194. Although random selection may not always be possible, it should be required whenever it is reasonable. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 130-31.
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have at least reasonable suspicion to believe that that individual is
crooked. The police may not always have enough evidence to arrest;
therefore, further surreptitious activity directed at that individual
may be necessary.'" 5 Must the police go back to the magistrate at
this point or do the circumstances obviate that necessity?
The police should not be required to return to the magistrate
for authorization to investigate the "crooked suspect." Rather, the
police should continue to gather evidence within the already judicially approved undercover operation. This could involve, for example, offering the suspect additional bribes or buying additional stolen goods from her. Several factors lead to this conclusion. First, one
of the goals of this type of undercover operation is to uncover criminal activity; thus, implicit within the initial warrant application is a
request to pursue further those who appear guilty. Furthermore, it
was noted earlier that the detection and investigative phases tend to
merge in non-targeted operations.' Of course, if the police continually return to the magistrate there is also the possibility that he may
become over-involved with the operation, a result which was condemned by the Court in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York."'
Abscam, judged by the standards developed above, fails miserably to pass constitutional muster. First, there was no factual foundation to believe that political corruption was a problem serious
enough to merit investigation. There may have been reasonable suspicion to suspect certain Congressmen of illegality based on allegations of informants and middlemen; however, there was not reasonable suspicion to support an operation to detect for other crooked
officials. Second, the operation significantly changed its focus midcourse without obtaining permission from a judicial officer at FBI
headquarters. Begun in early 1978 to uncover stolen artwork, the
operation became within eighteen months an operation to uncover
political corruption."'8 Third, of course, no warrant was obtained to
conduct the operation and no exigent circumstances existed to excuse that shortcoming. Fourth, no prophylactic measures were
adopted to minimize the effects of the invasion of privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
A large gap currently exists in the Supreme Court's fourth
amendment jurisprudence. Undercover operations seriously invade
195. In a majority of cases, however, the police should have probable cause to
arrest. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31. Cf. United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
197. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
198. Nathan, supra note 146, at 5.
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reasonable expectations of privacy but remain outside the protection
of the Constitution. The Court has yet to examine these police techniques according to the standards developed in Katz and Camara,
but it is questionable whether the Court, given its decisions in the
area, would decide that undercover operations are restricted by the
fourth amendment. Nonetheless, based on the privacy interests affected and the Court's recent precedents, it should find that undercover operations are subject to the warrant clause of the fourth
amendment.

